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ABSTRACT 
As networks grow, their vulnerability to attack increases. DoD networks 
represent a rich target for a variety of attackers. The number and sophistication of attacks 
continue to increase as more vulnerabilities and the tools to exploit them become 
available over the Internet. The challenge for system administrators is to secure systems 
against penetration and exploitation while maintaining connectivity and monitoring and 
reporting intrusion attempts. 
Traditional intrusion detection (ID) systems can take either a network or a host- 
based approach to preventing attacks. Many networks employ network-based ID systems. 
A more secure network will employ both techniques. This thesis will analyze the benefits 
of installing host-based ID systems, especially on the critical servers (mail, web, DNS) 
that lie outside the protection of the network ID system/Firewall. These servers require a 
layer of protection to ensure the security of the entire network and reduce the risk or 
attack. 
Three host-based ED systems will be tested and evaluated to demonstrate their 
benefits on Windows 2000 Server. The proposed added security of host-based ID 
systems will establish defense-in-depth and work in conjunction with the network-based 
ID system to provide a complete security umbrella for the entire network 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 6 years, Government and defense agencies in the United 
States have been victim to literally millions of attacks originating from the 
internet. Due to the low information security budgets and the weak 
security policies of such agencies, information security has become an 
uphill battle, as government and military servers are constantly being 
probed and attacked by crackers. 
The Network Security Solutions, Ltd., FIST Staff, February 2001. 
A.   BACKGROUND 
As the digital generation continues to expand, so does the use of personal 
computers for worldwide connectivity. This expansion has resulted in a myriad of 
complex computer security issues especially a greater susceptibility to exploitation and 
attack. The importance of maintaining safe, secure and efficient communications has 
increased, but the ability to do so has become increasingly more complex. As networks 
expand, the need to adopt a defense-in-depth posture of providing system security is 
amplified. The Department of Defense (DoD) relies on computers for nearly every aspect 
of its operation; DoD computer networks are a rich target for all attackers, foreign and 
domestic, professional and novice, insider and outsider. Information warfare can be 
waged extensively on computers, whether it is denial of services, exploitation of 
information, defacing web sites or deception. The number and sophistication of computer 
attacks has steadily grown as more vulnerabilities have been found and tools to exploit 
those vulnerabilities have become more readily available. The challenge currently facing 
government information system security managers is to secure government systems 
against exploitation and penetration while maintaining the availability of government 
systems, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of data transmitted, and establishing an 
effective means of monitoring and reporting intrusion attempts. 
Intrusion detection (ID) systems may offer a solution to the defense-in-depth 
strategy of protecting government networks. It is critical not only to prevent unauthorized 
access to government systems but also to have an alert mechanism to notify government 
personnel of intrusion attempts, successful or unsuccessful.  Every organization should 
know who is attempting to enter their network and why.   Intrusion detection systems 
seem to be the logical complement to network firewalls. An ID system will extend the 
system administrators'  security management capabilities to  include  security audit, 
monitoring, attack recognition, and response.   There are numerous commercial off-the- 
shelf (COTS) products designed to accomplish this goal.   A thorough evaluation is 
necessary to determine whether one of these products can successfully satisfy government 
requirements and enhances the standard of security for individual commands. This thesis 
will evaluate Windows 2000 Server vulnerabilities and review three host-based Intrusion 
Detection Systems: BlacklCE, ZoneAlarm and Sygate. The objective of this thesis is to 
provide an analysis of the benefit of utilizing host-based ID systems inside and outside 
the network firewall. 
To establish a baseline for evaluating intrusion detection systems certain terms 
need to be defined. 
B.        INTRUSIONS 
An intrusion is an attempt to break into or misuse a system. An intrusion can be 
any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability 
of a resource. In a military environment intrusions can be used for multiple purposes 
including compromise of information, denial of services, information warfare and 
deception. 
In September 2000, a large financial services company had their computer 
systems hacked, and credit card numbers for over 20,000 people were 
stolen. [Refl] 
In 1999, hackers hijacked nearly 500,000 credit card numbers and stored 
them on United States government computers. [Ref 2] 
The intrusion process begins when an intruder takes steps to fulfill an objective. 
The objective could be any type of attack including the theft of information, corruption of 
files, defacing a web site, or causing a denial of service. An essential component of an 
intrusion is taking advantage of one or more vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities exploited 
in this process can range from a software deficiency, such as a buffer overflow, to a flaw 
in an organizational structure that enables sensitive information such as logins and 
passwords to be determined through social engineering. The intrusion process ends when 
some or all of the objectives are achieved or the intruder gets discouraged and gives up. 
One goal of an Intrusion Detection System is to discourage an attacker to the point that he 
gives up. 
Attack objectives can range from sensitive information being stolen to denial of 
service (DOS). For example, an attacker can download sensitive information from the 
FTP or web server from the external host that is acting as a bridge between the Internet 
and the internal network. A denial of service attack would attempt to overwhelm the 
network to the point that it can no longer function properly. Common forms of this attack 
include: 
• SYN Flood 
• ICMP Flood (ping flood) 
• Smurf Attack 
• Mail Bombs 
• Host System Hogging 
• Rogue Applets 
The University of California at San Diego stated in a recent study that more than 
4000 Denial of Service attacks are unleashed every week. In February 2000 one such 
DOS attack crippled Ebay, Yahoo!, CNN, Datek, E*Trade, ZDNet and several other Web 
sites for several hours. Although this kind of attack is not destructive, in that no files are 
altered or destroyed, the Web site's ability to conduct business is severely impaired or 
completely interrupted for a period of hours or days. In a military environment where 
information flow is critical to mission success, this type of attack could be disastrous. 
ID systems can provide protection from some of these attacks. When the system 
receives a SYN packet, the ID system can determine if it is coming from a legitimate, 
authorized IP address. If the SYN packet is not from a valid IP address or if the request 
fits a certain suspicious pattern, a message is sent to the firewall to reject subsequent SYN 
packets from that IP address. It is imperative that the ID system has the capability of 
preventing unauthorized outgoing connections. 
Intruders who conduct such attacks can fall into two broad categories: Outside 
Intruders and Inside Intruders. Most people perceive the outside world to be the largest 
threat to their security. The media scare over "hackers", "crackers" and "attackers" 
coming in over the Internet has only heightened this perception. However, FBI studies 
have revealed that ninety percent of U.S. companies experienced Internet fraud over the 
past two years and eighty percent of intrusions and attacks came from within an 
organization. A mechanism is needed to detect both types of intrusions — a break-in 
attempt from the outside and a malicious attack from a knowledgeable insider. 
C.        INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
In a world of firewalls and security auditing tools, why is a real-time 
intrusion detection system needed? Similar to the use of security cameras and 
burglar alarms on a locked and guarded building, an ID system should be used on 
a secure network for the following reasons: 
1. Depth of defense: no matter how many security measures you have in place, if 
they are defeated, it is necessary to have a system that identifies this 
immediately — a "burglar alarm. 
2. Efficiency: ID systems, like security cameras and alarms, allow an 
organization to leverage fewer staff members to monitor and secure a larger 
area in an automated manner. It is cost and resource-prohibitive to place 
firewalls everywhere on the network and run security audits at all hours of the 
day. 
3. Route tracing: ID systems can provide incriminating forensic evidence that 
may not otherwise be available from firewall or audit logs (again fulfilling the 
role of the security camera). 
4. "Beware of Dog" sign effect: similar to the sign on a fence, a prominently 
displayed notice of intention to monitor traffic is often the only dissuasion 
attackers need to move on to another site with less-formidable security 
obstacles. 
Hardware-based network firewalls are ideal for implementing security 
policies between networks, but they can be expensive, complicated, inflexible, 
and quickly outdated-susceptible to new attacks. They may also be rendered 
ineffective by dialup access weaknesses, encryption, VPN's, and remote users 
connecting directly to the Internet from home. 
1.        Types Of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Most traditional intrusion detection systems take either a network or a host-based 
approach to recognizing and preventing attacks. A host-based ID system is designed to 
monitor the system on which it is installed. A traditional host-based ID system monitors 
the Operating System for attack signatures within log files or audit trails. A host-based 
ID system can also be used to monitor a specific application or database server. 
Currently, host-based ID system technologies are adapting to the changing industry, and a 
host-based ID system can employ a variety of techniques. A network-based ID system 
looks for specific patterns or attack signatures that indicate malicious or suspicious intent 
within network traffic. Network ID systems can use two different databases to identify 
intrusions: a built-in static signature database or a dynamic signature database that 
constantly monitors the system operations and updates its database automatically. Figure 
1 below illustrates both types of ID systems. 
Figure 1 - Types of ID Systems [From Ref 3] 
The host-based ED system resides at the Application Layer of the OSI model on 
the host as seen in Figure 2 and is therefore restricted to monitoring the audit trails of the 
operating system or applications. The Network-based ID system resides on a separate 
computer from the server and monitors all network traffic and audit data between the 
server and the clients. The Network ID system monitors information flow at all layers of 
the OSI model as depicted in Figure 3. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, 
and each is complementary to the other. A truly effective intrusion detection system will 
employ both technologies, providing a defense-in-depth. The personal ID systems 





























Figure 3 - Network ID System vs. OSI Model [From Ref 3] 
D.        ID SYSTEM METHODOLOGY 
There are generally two intrusion detection models: 
1. The Signature based detection model monitors system traffic for known 
attack signatures. The ID system evaluates packets to see if they correspond to a known 
intrusion pattern. Most successful intrusion detection systems rely on the signature 
detection model. Attacks, like viruses, are always changing, so the success of this model 
relies on maintaining a current signature library. 
2. The Anomaly based detection model looks for trends that deviate from a 
system's normal usage pattern or deviations from a user's normal behavior. The 
anomalies are detected by building up a profile of the system being monitored, and 
detecting significant deviations from this profile. Although the anomaly detection model 
doesn't rely on an up to date signature database, it is more difficult to engineer than the 
signature based model and is seldom utilized in the industry. The theory behind anomaly 
detection is based on metrics that are derived from system operations. These metrics are 
computed from available system parameters such as average CPU load, number of 
network connections per minute, number of processes per user, etc. ID systems that 
utilize the anomaly model often look for inconsistencies in the Operating System audit 
trails. Audit trail data forms a footprint of system usage over time and establishes a 
baseline. From these observations, the ID system can analyze system metrics to detect a 
possible intrusion. An anomaly may be a symptom of a possible intrusion, but it can also 
be a change in an authorized user's activity. Anomaly detection is more challenging than 
misuse detection since one cannot simply monitor for any known malicious patterns or 
signatures, thus it requires a more flexible approach which is far more complicated to 
develop. 
An ID system may also performs its own system monitoring and anomaly 
detection. It may keep aggregate statistics that provide a system usage profile. These 
statistics can be derived from a variety of sources such as CPU usage, disk I/O, memory 
usage, activities by users, number of attempted logins, etc. These statistics must be 
continually updated to reflect the current state of the system. The statistics are correlated 
with an internal model that allows the ID system to determine if a series of actions 
constitute a potential intrusion. This model may describe a set of intrusion scenarios or 
possibly encode the profile of a clean system. 
E.        EVALUATING ID SYSTEMS 
Personal host-based ID systems need to enforce particular security 
policies. They should have the ability to identify and block known port scans, 
Trojans and Denial of Service attacks, as well as protect against new or unknown 
attacks by blocking applications and traffic that violate a defined profile's security 
rules. These rule-based security policies should include any combination of the 
following: 
• Application - allowing each application access privileges to only certain 
required IP addresses, ports, or protocols 
• Trusted IP Addresses - allowing access privileges to specific IP addresses 
• Ports - allowing access privileges to specific ports 
• Protocols - allowing access privileges to specific protocols 
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•    Schedule - allowing automatic implementation of different security policies at 
different times. 
Intrusion detection monitoring and reporting is not full proof and error free. It is 
important to identify and minimize potentially misleading error reports. These errors can 
be categorized as either false positive, false negative or subversion errors.   A false 
positive occurs when the system classifies an action as anomalous (a possible intrusion) 
when it is a legitimate action.   These reports will normally be ignored since they are 
legitimate actions simply classified as intrusions.    If too many false positives are 
generated, the operators will come to ignore the output of the system, which may lead to 
actual intrusions being detected but ignored over time. A false negative occurs when an 
actual intrusive action has occurred but the system allows it to pass as a non-intrusive 
behavior.  False negative errors are more serious than false positive errors because they 
give a misleading sense of security.   By allowing all actions to proceed, a suspicious 
action will not be brought to the attention of the operator. The intrusion detection system 
is now a liability as the security of the system is less than it was before the ID system was 
installed.  An effective ID system will minimize these false alarms and missed attacks, 
while maximizing valid detections  through proper configuration  and monitoring, 
maintaining updated software patches and signature databases, and effective training of 
users and administrators. 
Additionally, ID systems can be susceptible to subversion.   A subversion error 
occurs when an intruder modifies the operation of the intrusion detector to force false 
negatives. An intruder could use knowledge about the internals of an intrusion detection 
11 
system to alter its operation, possibly allowing anomalous behavior to proceed. A human 
operator examining logs may discover this, but the intrusion detection system would 
appear to be working correctly. This is sometimes done by slowly altering the system's 
footprint or metrics over time. An intruder slowly introduces anomalies into the system 
to permit the ID system to allow greater anomalies, until it is safe for the intruder to 
launch an undetected attack. 
A good ID system should address certain basic issues, regardless of what 
mechanism it is based on. It ought to: 
• Run continually 
• Be fault tolerant 
• Resist subversion 
• Operate with minimal overhead 
• Be easily tailored to observe deviations and changes in system behavior 
• Be difficult to fool 
• Be able to back trace and identify the source of intrusion attempts 
It is difficult to identify and evaluate the processes, procedures, tools, Software, 
hardware, and databases that comprise the full range of intrusion detection technologies. 
Since the technology is continually evolving, the methods and processes of ID systems 
continue to develop and change. The process for evaluating an ID system requires setting 
up a network, controlling the operating environment, generating traffic samples, 
determining the required supporting data, and evaluating the results. Implementing 
intrusion detection systems on networks and hosts requires a broad understanding of 
12 
computer security. The complexity of information technology infrastructures is 
increasing so quickly that is has become nearly impossible for any one person to fully 
understand, let alone administer, systems in a way that is operationally secure. Vendors 
are rapidly releasing new ID systems and aggressively competing for market share in the 
ever-expanding market. Many products started out as point solutions, but in response to 
consumers' inability to fully understand and use them, many vendors are attempting to 
integrate approaches to solve a broader range of computer security problems. This 
illustrates the value of establishing a baseline for reviewing ID systems in order to 
determine their usefulness on government systems. Given the complexity of the problem 
outlined above, this thesis will focus on analyzing the current vulnerabilities inherent to 
Windows 2000 Server and demonstrating how off-the-shelf products like ZoneAlarm, 
BlacklCE and Sygate Personal Firewall can improve the security of government systems. 
Recommendations will be made for follow-on tests that would help further understand 
the benefits, utilities and operations of ID systems. 
The diagram on the following page (Figure 4) illustrates how a typical 
network-based intrusion detection system works. The picture shows the flow of 
an attack being launched, the ID system sniffing the packets, comparing the 
packets to the database of known attacks, reacting to the attack, blocking 
dangerous traffic, and alerting the system operator/administrator to the attack. 
13 
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Figure 4 - Network-based ID System Operation [From Ref 4] 
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II. PROBLEM PROPOSAL 
It doesn't take long to figure out the security problem with these port 
technologies: If a port lets data flow out, it also lets data flow in. A port is 
essentially an opening into your computer, and it can be hacked. Someone 
can infect your machine with a Trojan horse in this way, and that's only 
one of a host of distressing possibilities. If you open your computer to the 
outside world, you're vulnerable to attack — period. 
Randall, Neil, "Freeware Port Scanners: Plug the Holes", PC Magazine. 
URL: 
http ://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/reviews/0,4161,2651662,00.html 
(16 November 2000). 
A.        INTRODUCTION TO ID SYSTEM PROBLEM 
Many networks administrators do not realize the value of employing host-based 
and network-based ID systems simultaneously. Host-based ID systems could be used to 
assist network-based ID systems in protecting client stations inside the firewall as well as 
providing a much needed layer of protection for the vital servers that lie outside the 
network firewall - DNS, mail, and web. In making these servers available to the outside 
world, they are vulnerable to attacks. Host-based ID systems could provide protection 
from this security risk. 
Recent research conducted at the NPS illustrates the vulnerability of systems 
located outside the network firewall. Data collected and analyzed in the NPS RIDLR lab 
demonstrated how often unprotected servers were penetrated for exploitation. 
A Honeypot is a set of systems that simulates a real network. The 
Honeypot is used to observe accesses and attempted accesses. This 
provides advanced warning of a more concerted attack. [Ref 5] 
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The Honeypot, in a sense, provides the ability to 'get into the head' of the 
attacker: analogous to preparing for a game by watching films of the rival team. The 
results of Honeypots has proved not only beneficial in identifying patterns and methods of 
attack but also in identifying the need for a capable host-based intrusion detection system. 
These results endorse the need for research, testing and evaluation of commercial 
intrusion detection systems. 
To develop a defense-in-depth approach requires an understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of commercial intrusion detection systems. There are a vast 
number of commercial ID system products available on the market today. The evaluation 
of all these products is impractical, so a small sampling will be taken and a test site 
configured. Host-based ID systems are one possible step toward enhancing the protection 
of servers located outside the firewall and improving security on client computers within 
the firewall. This thesis will compare three host-based ID systems installed on a 
Windows 2000 Server and present the strengths and weaknesses of each. Consideration 
will also be given to the benefit of installing host-based ID systems on the client 
machines within a network. 
The principle reason for system security is to protect systems from the numerous 
vulnerabilities inherent to computers networks. These vulnerabilities are predominantly: 
• Software bugs 
• System configuration 
• Password cracking 
• Sniffing unsecured traffic and 
• Design flaws. 
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Attackers will attempt to exploit any and every available weakness in a system. 
The Internet contains a plethora of information regarding software design flaws and 
hacking tools that render a system vulnerable. The availability of this information makes 
it difficult to continually patch every hole in a network to prevent exploitation. 
The attacker's methodology begins with scanning a range of network IP 
addresses to determine which individual systems are alive and what services are 
available. Enumeration is then done to identify valid user accounts or poorly protected 
resource shares. Finally, the attacker uses escalation to increase permission to gain 
access to vital information and services. 
This thesis will focus on the first step of this process. Port Scanning is one of the 
most popular reconnaissance techniques attackers use to discover services they can break 
into. All machines connected to a LAN or connected to the Internet via a modem run 
various services that listen to ports, both well-known and some not so well-known. Port 
scanning allows the attacker to find which ports are available, being listened to by a 
service, on the computer. Ports provide access to services and services provide access to 
applications and data which can lead to exploits. Essentially, a port scan consists of 
sending a message to each port, one at a time. The kind of response received indicates 
whether the port is available and can therefore be probed further for weakness. A TCP/IP 
port is a logical communication portal by which information can flow. All Internet 
protocols communicate via ports, and specific information is normally designated to use a 
specific port. Examples of well known ports are listed below: 
17 
•    Echo 7/tcp Echo 
•   FTP-Dta 20/udp File Transfer [Default Data] 
•   FTP 21/tcp File Transfer [Control] 
•    SSH 22/tcp SSH Remote Login Protocol 
•   Telnet 23/tcp Telnet 
•    SMTP 25/tcp E-mail 
•   Domain 53/udp Domain Name Server 
•   WWW/HTTP 80/tcp World Wide Web/HTTP 
The simplest port scan attempts to send a carefully constructed packet to each 
possible port, 0-65535, on the target system to see which ports are open. Using a system 
call such as connect() the port scan utility attempts to open a connection to every 
interesting port on the machine. If the port is listening, connect() will succeed, otherwise 
the port is not reachable. Once an open door is identified, the hacker has achieved the 
first objective towards exploiting a target computer. This fact makes it imperative to 
have a reliable and effective intrusion detection system. Port scanning will be the initial 
test conducted in the lab on our test server. 
18 
III.  TEST BED SETUP AND CONFIGURATION 
A.        EQUIPMENT 
The equipment required to conduct the tests includes: three desktop computers - 
one to act as the network server, one to execute the attack and one for connectivity to 
the Internet for research and resources; one hub to enable connectivity between the 
network computer and the attack computer; one copy of Windows 2000 Server; one 
copy of Windows 2000 Professional; one copy of SuperScan and LanGuard port 
scanning programs; and licensed copies of ZoneAlarm, BlacklCE and Sygate 
intrusion detection systems. All hardware and software were checked to ensure they 
were compatible and the minimum system requirements were met. 
The following illustration (Figure 5) depicts the lab configuration. 
19 
Intel Pentium II266 MHz 
256K Cache, 256M Ram 








Intel Pentium 266 MHz 
256K Cache, 64M Ram 
Win 2000 Professional 
Simulated 
Mail/Web Server 
Intel Celeron 400 MHz 
128K Cache, 256M Ram 





Figure 5-Lab Configuration 
The network server installation included: 
• Windows 2000 Server installed with the following specifications: 
• Enabled as a Domain Controller 
• Active Users and Directories enabled 
• TELNET disabled (by default) 
• IP security was disabled by default (no specific port restrictions) 
• Microsoft Office 2000 
• User accounts were created and share folders designated 
• IP address 192.168.100.40 was configured 
• Additionally, no specific security measures were implemented and the system 
was run for a period of time to ensure that it was functioning properly. No 
intrusion detection system was installed for the baseline tests. 
The attack computer configuration included: 
• Windows 98 and Windows 2000 Professional in a dual boot configuration 
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• IP address was configured to 192.168.100.80 
• SuperScan 3.0, LanGuard software installed 
To evaluate the integrity of the network server, a series of attacks were run to 
interrogate the overall security of the Windows 2000 Server machine. To simulate the 
first step in a typical attack, the attack computer used commercial scanning software 
available for free off the Internet. 
The primary test program used was SuperScan 3.0. SuperScan is a connection- 
based TCP port scanner, pinger and hostname resolver. This program performs ping 
scans and port scans using any IP range. In addition it will resolve and reverse-lookup 
any IP address or range. A second series of scans were run to validate the SuperScan test 
results using LanGuard. LanGuard port scanner is a freeware tool that allows you to scan 
a network for active ports and identify unused applications such as web servers that could 
be a security hole. 
Resident programs and commands within the Microsoft Operating System such as 
FTP and ping were used to further verify the level of security provided by the ID system. 
Connection attempts were made to determine if the ID system was actually protecting 
ports or simply making them invisible to scans. 
The tests were conducted and information collected and compared against four 
system configurations: 
• A Windows 2000 Server with no ID system 
• A Windows 2000 Server protected by ZoneAlarm 
• A Windows 2000 Server protected by BlacklCE 
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•   A Windows 2000 Server protected by Sygate 
Additionally, various security levels or configurations of each intrusion detection 
system was tested and evaluated. The results were analyzed to determine the overall 
strengths and weaknesses of each ID system. Snap shots of the program windows from 
the attack computer and the host server are included to help illustrate the findings and 
facilitate the comparison. 
B.       INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
1.        Zone Alarm 
ZoneAlarm is one the most widely disseminated ID system programs. Its 
popularity is primarily due to the fact that the software is available at no cost for personal 
use. This fact and the positive reviews of the program supported the selection of 
ZoneAlarm as one of the ID systems tested. 
ZoneAlarm combines the safety of a dynamic firewall with total 
control over applications' Internet use. ZoneAlarm gives rock- 
solid protection against thieves and vandals. ZoneAlarm now 
features MailSafe to stop email-borne Visual Basic Script worms, 
like the "I Love You" virus, "dead-in-its-tracks", thwarting its 
spread, and preventing it from wreaking havoc on your PC. 
ZoneAlarm makes ironclad Internet security easy-to-use. [Ref 6] 
The ZoneAlarm program is based on True Vector technology. TrueVector is 
basically a software engine made by Zone Labs that runs on the operating system (Win32) 
to report Internet connection activity to client applications. TrueVector performs all 
monitoring, logging and filtering work, and is responsible for intercepting process- 
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loading and unloading. It keeps a list of currently active processes, and intercepts certain 
keyboard, mouse and other user activities in order to determine the active application. 
TrueVector can check for various characteristics including executable name, version 
numbers, executable file checksums, version headers, and configuration settings. 
ZoneAlarm with TrueVector is designed to: 
• Give notification when applications are accessing the Internet 
• See the type of access: URL, site, EP address, port address 
• See the protocol being used 
• See the type of data being sent or used 
• Determine the time and the date of data requests 
• Control bandwidth consumed per application 
ZoneAlarm has security-level controls for both local (trusted) communications 
and external Internet connections. Each category has three choices - low, medium and 
high. The user can select six different security configurations (L/L, L/M, M/M, L/H, 
M/H,H/H). 







Enforces application privileges. 
Internet Lock blocks all traffic. 
Hides all ports not in use by a 
program (sometimes called 
Stealth Mode) 
Blocks local access to Windows 
services and shares 
Enforces application privileges. 
Internet Lock blocks all traffic. 
Allows access to Windows 
services and shares. 
Leaves your computer and server 
applications visible to the local 
network. 
Enforces application privileges 
Internet Lock blocks only 
application traffic. 
Allows access to Windows 
services and shares. 
Leaves your computer and server 
applications visible to the local 
network. 
INTERNET 
Enforces application privileges. 
Internet Lock blocks all traffic. 
Hides all ports not in use by a 
program (sometimes called 
Stealth Mode) 
Blocks Internet access to file and 
print sharing. 
Enforces application privileges. 
Internet Lock blocks all traffic. 
Blocks Internet access to file and 
print sharing. 
Leaves computer visible to the 
Internet 
Enforces application privileges 
Internet Lock blocks only 
application traffic. 
Allows Internet access to file and 
print sharing. 
Leaves computer visible to the 
Internet 
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Snapshot #1 illustrates the Security Settings menu for ZoneAlarm: 
ZoneAlarm 
A1ERTS     1 LOOC       t      SECUWTY.:  f    PROGRMIS j    CONFIGURE  1 
f     [Ädvancedij   J 
r-Security level 
Use these sliders to choose security levels for your local and Internet access. 
Local     Internet 
High 
Recommended setting for 
computers connected directly to 
the Internet or an untrusted 
network. 
Strong security: 
- Enforces application privileges. 
- Internet Lock blocks all traffic. 
- Blocks local network access to 
Windows services and shares. 
- Stealth mode: firewall hides all 
ports not in use by a program. 
EE 
High 
Recommended setting for all 
configurations. 
Strong security: 
- Enforces application privileges. 
- Internet Lock blocks aB traffic. 
- Blocks Internet access to 
Windows services and file/printer 
Ö Block local servers 
- Stealth mode: firewall hides all 
ports not in use by a program. 
C1 Block Internet servers 
■ MailSafe e-mail protection — 
F7i Enable MailSafe protection to quarantine e-mail script attachments 
Click here to upgrade to ZoneAlarm Pro. 4 
Snapshot 1 - ZoneAlarm Security Settings 
The tests conducted only focused on the Internet security settings. Additional 
features of ZoneAlarm included pop-up windows alerting the user of possible intrusions 
and a log file of all activity on the computer it is monitoring. In medium and high 
security mode ZoneAlarm blocks all traffic until the user grants permission. 
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2.        BlackICE 
BlacklCE was developed by Network Ice Corporation and claims to be a full- 
featured personal firewall. 
BlacklCE works continually to defend servers and workstations from over 
200 hacker signatures including the Melissa Worm, "Slow Scans" and 
"Back Orifice." Even if hackers bypass firewalls or intrusion defenses, 
BlacklCE bars entry at the desktop and server. [Ref 7] 




Blocks all unsolicited inbound traffic. May restrict some web 




Blocks all unsolicited inbound traffic except for some interactive 
web site content, (such as streaming media) 
Only blocks unsolicited network traffic that accesses operating 
system and networking services 
All ports remain open and unblocked, and therefore allows all 
inbound traffic 
In addition to the security levels, BlacklCE has 3 protection tabs to further define 
the program configuration: 
ENABLE AUTO BLOCKING - This feature automatically blocks all 
attempts to break into a system.   If unchecked, an attack will still be 
reported and logged, but not automatically blocked. 
ALLOW INTERNET FILE SHARING - When enabled, an external 
connection can be made to a computer over the Internet to upload or 
download files.  If unchecked it prevents systems from connecting to the 
computer and accessing the shares. 
ALLOW  NETBIOS  NEIGHBORHOOD  -  When  enabled  the  host 
computer will appear in the Network Neighborhood of other computers, 
and the host name is resolved on scans. 
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Snapshot #2 illustrates the security settings menu for BlacklCE Defender: 
BlacklCE Settings 
1~    Detection ] ICEcap | Preferences 
Protection       I      Packet Log      |       Evidence Log      j       Back Trace 
Manage the BlacklCE protection levels and network file sharsig capabilities. 
p Protection Level 1 
(*  Paranpi3       Blocks all unsolicited inbound traltic 
O Nervous        Blocks most unsolicited inbound traffic. 
C Cautious        Blocks xrnne unrohcired inbound traffic 
1
     C Trusting        Allows alrhbound traffic. ! 
W Enable Auto-Blocking 
V Alow Internet file sharing 
r Allow rielBIQS Neighborhood 
OK       |       Cancel    J        Aopry Hefe 
Snapshot 2 - BlacklCE Settings Menu 
BlacklCE Defender is composed of a detection and analysis engine that 
constantly monitors the inbound and outbound traffic between your computer and 
the Internet or other computers on a network. The core of the BlacklCE product is 
the patent-pending seven-layer decoding engine. This engine analyzes incoming 
and outgoing network traffic in real-time for intrusions. Unlike most modern 
intrusion detection systems, which use "pattern matching" technologies, BlacklCE 
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uses sophisticated protocol analysis algorithms. Protocol analysis examines the 
structure and composition of network communications. BlacklCE considers this a 
more efficient way to detect and identify attacks while allowing it to detect 
sophisticated intrusions that pattern matching software cannot catch. 
3.        Sygate 
Sygate Technologies has recently entered the host-based intrusion detection 
market with Sygate Personal Firewall 4.0. According to Sygate's website their product is: 
Sygate is more than an advanced, user-friendly personal firewall - it is a 
bi-directional intrusion detection system. [Ref 8] 
Sygate's serves as a firewall by controlling access to communications ports and 
monitoring port-scanning activity. As an intrusion defense agent, Sygate hopes to allow 
only trusted communications and considers any other network activity as malicious. 
Using a guilty until proven innocent approach, Sygate claims to preserve system 
resources by maintaining a 60,000-signature library of known attacks, but only uses it for 
reporting purposes. This rules-based approach is less memory intensive but requires 
more user interaction. 






Prevents all information entering or leaving your computer from 
any outside source. 
Automatically blocks any access from your computer until the 
user grants access. Allows user to alter the "status" of different 
applications.  
Permits the transmission of all network traffic to and from your 
computer. Still logs all traffic  
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Sygate Personal Firewall 4.0 provides users with performance enhancing features 
including: 
• Dynamic Interface Support - Allows users to configure separate security 
policies for each network interface card directly from the user interface 
• Application Learning Mode - Enables Sygate Personal Firewall to 
remember which applications have been allowed or blocked by the user 
• Application Authentication - Uses MD5 cryptographic signatures to check 
application attributes such as checksum, path and file name, warning users to 
applications compromised by a hacker or Trojan 
• Dynamic Port Blocking - Automatically blocks ports when applications that 
otherwise use them are idle, reducing exposure to attack 
• High Performance Security - Ensures top-notch security while minimizing 
impact to system performance 
Sygate Personal Firewall provides pop-up window notification of any new or 
modified applications, detected attacks or user-specified events, and has a box to check to 
remember these notification responses to eliminate redundancy. The illustrations below 
(Snapshots 3 and 4) are examples of the user interface notification provided by Sygate. 
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»*ä* No t•.": irpssr^g 
DetJWotma6bo:officJiPlay«iriäthe:cbra^ 
file Description. :' '■ 
Process.vjllr.s^ „■•.;-' -v^.J 
Connection oxigli» : I 
PcVlcckcoi-: :,• • :::?.;:;'; V'"; 
local AAJEess.'j V.~ \i 
local Poet : 
Remove Brame-1':'.]■_ 
Remoce: Address •'S/iVi- 
Rsmoee.PorC  : - 
RealPlayer   .  . •• '!""'   , : ;:-v; '    - - '' ■ '."'   '*■''" 
t JD's VPro'oraM Tiie*V^*l^R*^Pi«^E\reBtl^i«y: ex*'■ 
JFJTPC1E23 :{Hexijw^};v:42i9^1MW:"^cimaÜL) .. 
local, initiated '.-'■ 
lÄTCjp:::::.^v;'■■•':  ■■•;.:-i:; 
10 o e iiD 
I 1726 :■'■': • •:' • ■.'-     •-•";;; 
:
 reaipuide. reel ^ COCK. 
EtäierÄtf-pieke!P';dä«dtl»:- =?.";;.;-':-';''"V.- ."'■-" ;".-v,; 
Ethernet II'^PacKee-.tettgcäf.-.62)   " ■ 
3>e*eln««±öiriv:-;;;: r 00^<«Hb7-25-4i^aC.;i 
Seiutc'er ■•.'::'   007*0-CC--57:-4ST:?9: 
TVfpe:. IP : (OxOSDO)'.:' 
Znt-Tie- Protocol 
Sygate notifies the user when a 
program is attempting to connect and 
provides helpful details regarding the 
application. 
Snapshot 3 - Sygate Alert Window 
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Snapshot 4 - Sygate Security Log 
C.       DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
A series of standard attack methods was launched against the Windows 2000 
Server computer simulating a network server located outside a firewall. All activity on 
both the attack and network computers were monitored and snapshots of the resulting 
data copied. The evaluation was conducted against the following configurations: 
• Windows 2000 Server with no ID system. 
• Windows 2000 Server with ZoneAlarm 2.6 installed. 
• Windows 2000 Server with BlacklCE 2.5 installed. 
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• Windows 2000 Server with Sygate Personal Firewall 4.0 Build 671 installed. 
The same set of exploits will be conducted against each of the four system 
configurations and the resulting data will be evaluated to determine the effectiveness of 
each ID system at securing the network server from exploitation. Consideration will be 
given, not only to stopping attacks, but also to how well the ID system alerts the user and 
system administrator to the real-time existence of attacks. 
The evaluation criteria key elements will include: 
• Effectiveness of intrusion detection 
• Effectiveness of security protection 
• Effectiveness of reaction 
• User interface 
The questions considered will include: 
• What is the benefit of a host-based ID system to overall network security 
• How effective is a host-based ID system 
• Are host-based ID systems a possible solution to a defense in-depth posture 
for networks 
• How easy is an ID system to implement and use, is it any more difficult than a 
virus scanning program 
• Does the security benefits justify the additional cost of implementing host- 
based ID systems 
• What follow-on testing should be conducted 
• Should a standard test platform be developed for commercial ID systems 
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The above criteria and questions will be used during the process of the evaluation 
and to determine the effectiveness of adding host-based intrusion detection systems to 
network servers outside the firewall as well as client stations within the firewall. 
33 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
34 
IV. TEST DATA RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The tests conducted emulate the first step in the intrusion process, port scanning. 
Most attackers only focus on the available ports detected through the use of a scanning 
tool. To properly identify how each of the ID systems performs in each of the key criteria 
elements, we evaluated the results of each system against an identical port scan using 
SuperScan 3.0. LandGuard port scanner was also used to validate the SuperScan results. 
An FTP connection was attempted to TCP port 21 in an effort to determine whether the 
ID systems masked the opened ports or actually blocked the available ports. The ping 
command was used to verify the ID systems were actually hiding the IP address from 
scanners. Snapshots from the attacking computer and the server will highlight the 
effectiveness of each ID system and indicate the array of features each ID system offers. 
1.        NO ID SYSTEM INSTALLED 
The initial test consisted of a port scan utility run against Windows 2000 Server 
with no ID system. The scan was conducted using SuperScan against ports 0-65,535. 
The results of this scan indicated 21 ports located on the host server (NPS- 
TESTSERVER) were available as seen in Snapshot 5 below. 
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Snapshot 5 - SuperScan vs. Win2K Server with no ID system 
The results of this scan indicate that quite a large amount of information regarding 
the network server: IP address, host name, available port numbers, and services available 
on those ports. 
The following ports and services were available with no ID system installed. This 
list represents the default ports Windows 2000 Server makes available in order to perform 
routine tasks. The available ports can be modified depending on the requirements of the 
server and will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four. 
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A brief description of the port identified and any known Trojans used against 
these port is listed below: 
7 Echo - Echoes back every line of text typed at it. 
9 Discard (sink null) - Everything sent to this server should silently 
disappear. 
13       Daytime - The server returns a packet in ASCII character string containing 
the date in readable form. 
17       Quote of the Day - Sends a "Quote of the Day" regardless of input. 
19       Character Generator (ttytst source) - Server spits characters in an endless 
stream. 
21       File Transfer [Control] - Allow transfer of files from one computer to 
another. It uses two channels, one a control channel ftp/top and the other a 
data channel ftp-data/tcp. The DarkFTP Trojan also uses this port. 
25       Simple Mail Transfer/* - De facto email standard for the internet. Also 
used by following Trojan horses: Ajan, Antigen, Email Password Sender, 
Haebu Coceda, Happy 99, Kuang2, NewApt, Promail Trojan, Shtrilitz 
Stealth, Tapiras, Terminator, WinPC, WinSpy. 
42       Host Name Server - This is the old DNS.    Replaced by the domain 
protocol. Microsoft's WINS may also support directory replication at this 
port. 
53       Domain Name Server. 
80       World Wide Web HTTP/* - Known Trojan horses: Executor, Hooker, and 
RingZero. 
88       Kerberos - Implements a trusted third-party authentication protocol. 
119     Network News Transfer Protocol/* - nntp=provides a client-server news 
feed protocol to allow clients to read "news". Happy 99 Trojan uses this 
port. 
135     Microsoft DCE endpoint resolution/Location Service. 
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139     NETBIOS Session Service - "File and Printer Sharing" on a Windows 
machine uses this port extensively, which is frequently an exploitable 
security hole. 
389     Lightweight Directory Access Protocol - Allows access via TCP to an 
X.500 directory.   Used by NetMeeting - Internet Locator Server (ILS) 
using LDAP. 
443     http protocol over TLS/SSL. 
445     Microsoft-DS - It is used by Windows 2000 for SMB over TCP and UDP, 
concurrently or alternatively with the traditional implementation over ports 
137,138 and 139. 
464     Kpasswd. 
563     nntp protocol over TLS/SSL (was snntp) - Supported by MS Exchange. 
636     ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap) - This is used by NetMeeting. 
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Additionally, we were able to connect to the server (Snapshot 6) using the File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP). These results indicated in Snapshots 5 and 6 highlight the 
availability of information from the network server and the need to have a mechanism in 




Snapshot 6 - Attack computer connected to server with FTP 
2.        ID Systems Installed 
Each of the three Intrusion Detection Systems was separately installed on the host 
computer. The same ports scan and FTP connection tests were run against all three ID 
systems. All of the various configurations of each ID system were selected and tested. 
To maintain continuity, nothing else was altered on the Window 2000 Server platform. 
The following are the results of the tests conducted. 
a.        ZoneAlarm 
ZoneAlarm was loaded and configured in each of its six possible security 






















21 ports resolved 
18 ports resolved 
18 ports resolved 
0 ports resolved 
0 ports resolved 









The only configurations in which ZoneAlarm provided complete 
protection against the port scan utility were when the Internet security level was 
configured to HIGH. The Internet security setting was the only relevant factor due to the 
port scan test running from an external connection. In the Low and Medium Internet 
configuration ports were still available and an FTP connection was possible. The Internet 
Low setting revealed all 21 available ports and no alerts were generated in the logs. The 
Internet Medium setting effectively blocked access to 3 ports. These 3 ports (ports 135, 
139 and 445) all perform file and print sharing services. The Internet Medium setting is 
designed to block Internet access to file and print sharing, so the test results validate the 
claims. 
Snapshot 7 shows total protection from discovery when configured in 
Internet High. The host name was not detected and no open ports were revealed. On the 
host, ZoneAlarm provided pop-up alerts identifying the intrusion attempt, IP address and 
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port number of the attacking computer (Snapshots 8 and 9). The built-in alert log tracks 
all activity and stores it in a text file. 
Snapshot 7 - SuperScan vs. Win2K Server with ZoneAlarm Internet High 
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PROTECTED 
The firewall has blocked Internet access to your 
computer (FTP) from 192168.100.80 (TCP Port 
2910) [TCP Flags: SJ. 
Time: 6/8/20011:30:56 PM 
r^^prelnfo ^J 
i#s? 
D Don't show this dialog again 
^-  -    ■ ■       i 
i— Pi «rant alorff>- 
Snapshot 8 - ZoneAlarm Pop-up message 
ZoneAlarm 
- Today's summary  
Bytes sent 16.08 KB   Bytes received 11.61 KB 
-Current alerts - 
The firewal has blocked Internet access to your "*1 ( more infö"= ^i 
computer (Telnet) horn 192168100.80 (TCP Port TT- Vwss—SFW 
2912) [TCP Flags: SJ. _     f^ZTT1 NH 5 
TIT«: 6/8/20011:34:26 PM 
-Alert settings  
I5Ü Log alerts to a text file 
C:\WINNTSER\lntemet Logs^ZALog.txt (1k) 
E Show the alert popup window 
IP address and port number 
of attacker 
Options to log all alerts in a 
file and display a pop-up 
window 
CBck here to upgrade to ZoneAlarm Pro. 3 
Snapshot 9 - ZoneAlarm Current Alert Message 
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b.        Blackice 
BlackICE was installed, configured and tested in each of its four security 
levels. In Cautious mode BlackICE blocks only unsolicited traffic that accesses operating 
system and network services; therefore, all but 2 ports (563 and 636) that do not access 
these services were blocked. The results are captured in Table 5 below: 
SECURITY 
SETTING 





TRUSTING 1953 21 PORTS RESOLVED YES 
CAUTIOUS 5,200 2 PORTS RESOLVED NO 
NERVOUS 11,727 0 PORTS RESOLVED NO 
PARANOID 16,000 0 PORTS RESOLVED NO 
In Paranoid mode, BlackICE blocked all the ports and concealed the 
hostname; however, the host IP address was still identified by SuperScan as seen in 
Snapshot 10. 
43 
Snapshot 10 - SuperScan vs. Win2K with BlacklCE in Paranoid Mode 
44 
Snapshot 11 below shows the reporting mechanism BlacklCE uses to alert 
the host computer of the intrusion attempts. It properly identifies the intruder address, 
date, time, attack type and the number of attacks. 
:» BlacklCE Defender 
Ete    Wew    Tools   Help 
Attacks | Intruders j History] Information j 
ra-.fj--; 
Time Attack I Irtfriirlpr 
[Scan] Attacker systematically scans through many ports on a system 
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# 06/01/01 1213:45 
® 06/01/01 1212:43 
# 06/01/01 1212:32 
# 06/01/01 12:1232 
§> 06/01/01 1211:46 
& 06/01/01 1211:37 
TCP SYN flood 
TCP port probe 
TCP port scan 
TCP SYN flood 
TCP port scan 














Help     | 
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Snapshot 11 - BlacklCE Attack Log 
c.        Sygate 
Sygate Personal Firewall was installed, configured and tested in Allow, 
Normal and Block modes. The results of the SuperScan test are listed in Table 6 below. 
SECURITY 
LEVEL 






ALLOW ALL 0 21 PORTS RESOLVED YES 
NORMAL 1300 0 PORTS RESOLVED NO 
BLOCK ALL 0 (Everything shut down) 0 PORTS RESOLVED NO 
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Similar to ZoneAlarm in its most secure mode, Sygate also blocked all 
information in its most secure mode as seen in Snapshot 12 below. 
-_ SuperScan 3.00 
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iBesölved 
p Configuration^ 
.* Port Et setup 
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£3 i" ;""' '==srS}}ftm—•' ;r* GnXi.scanresponsivepir)»SV"•'"1 ;i tiaZlS&IOa'jO;'V^RF; 
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. ...^l-..,r;.....:,,-' ;.; - -J2000  y.lj:p£^wftäiajjv.:-;;;-^.,            __ 
Snapshot 12 - SuperScan vs. Win2000 Server with Sygate Block All mode 
Sygate's reporting utilities were extensive as seen in Snapshot 13. The 
program blocked all access to the host ports and correctly identified the intruder's IP 
address and port number. 
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Snapshot 13 - Sygate Traffic Log 
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In addition to a Traffic Log, Sygate offers a Packet Log (Snapshot 14) that 
identifies each packet and its contents. 
' Log Viewer — Packet Log 
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195 
196 
192.168.100.80    i 1346 1 92168.100.40 
192.168.100.80    ! 1348 1192168.100.40 





r 06/08/2001 11:43:12 
f 06/08/2001 11:43:12 
192168.100.80    ! 1351 192168.100.40 
192.1G8.100.80     ! 1350 192168.100.40 
192.168.100.80    | 1352 192.168.100.40 




f 06/08/200111:43:12 192.168.100.80     I 1355 192168.100.40       206 
r 06/08/2001 11:43:12 
106/08/2001 11:43:12 
192.168.100.80    (1354 192168.100.40     | 205 
192.168.100.80     i 1356 192168.100.40     |207 
Packet Decode: 
(TCP) Transmission Control Protocol 
Source port: 1349 
Destination port: 200 
Sequence number: 88939596 
Acknowledgment number: 0 






0000: 00 50 04 D4 65 2A 00 E0 : 29 0E 3B 7E 
0010: 00 30 B3 02 40 00 80 06 : FD FB CO A8 
0020: 64 28 05 45 00 C8 05 4D : IC 4C 00 00 
0030: 20 00 Fl AF 00 00 02 04 : 05 B4 01 01 
3 
iL 
Snapshot 14 - Sygate Packet Log 
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B.       FTP RESULTS 
FTP was used to verify the ID systems were actually protecting ports and not 
simply making them invisible to scans. FTP was not able to establish a connection with 
any of the ID systems in their more secure modes. Snapshot 4 below shows the failed 
connection that resulted from an FTP with the server when an ID system was installed. 
10060 is a FTP error message that means a connection could not be established. The ID 
systems not only hide all ports, but close them down as well. 
|S MS-DOS Prompt HMB] 
j* i3 x 2z'^&iSS?M :Ils?ll: 
^M|P=I 





-v- Y*, «      <•*"■ /%io v*^ £^s ^ "T"      a 1 n^hM If! 
:   1     Up >  disconnect ■11 
■ ;.■'■: 
|„^^-V-^^                V^.^/0, 
•»si 
I               -                        * B..' 
i:~" \> a 
Bill 
W^M^^S^S^^^^^^SS^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M ■'"{^I*"JÜ' 
Snapshot 15 - FTP reaction vs. Win2K Server with ZoneAlarm, BlacklCE and Sygate 
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C.       PING RESULTS 
The ping command was used to determine if the ID system was hiding the host IP 
address when SuperScan reported no active host found as indicated by the red "X" next to 
the IP address in the SuperScan windows included above. It was determined that Ping 
did not receive a response back from the server when the ID systems were configured 
such that the no active host was found, i.e. ZoneAlarm in High Internet security setting 
and Sygate in Normal and Block All modes. 
'z MS-DOS Piompt 
|fe 12 x20 WM'lWfZ&iZ'??"^?: 
Snapshot 16 - Ping Results against ID System configurations that did not detect an active 
host IP address 
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D.       ADDITIONAL TEST DATA 
Windows 2000 Server provides the network administrator with the flexibility to 
modify the available port listing. Test data was collected to determine the effectiveness 
of the TCP/IP filtering utility. Snapshot 17 indicates that only ports 21 and 80 were 
enabled. Snapshot 18 reveals that even with no ID system installed all ports were 
successfully blocked except ports 21 and 80. Subsequently, tests were conducted with 
each ID system running to determine if the ID system would run more efficiently or still 
report a port scan of the ports that were disabled using TCP/IP filtering. All 3 ID systems 
recognized and reported port scan alerts identical to the initial tests run with all ports 
open. There appeared to be no benefit to the ID systems to restrict access to any specific 
ports. 
TCP/IP Filtering 
R Enable TCP/IP Filtering W adapter:) 
K1 ?|xj 
C Permit AJ 





■C Permit Onhr^ 
C7 PermjtAI 
■C Permit Or&r- 
Add.; 
Remove 
! UDP Ports i IP Protocols 
OKI Cancel 
Snapshot 17 - Win2K TCP/IP Filtering Menu 
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•_ SuperScan 3.00 
' i 1192.168.100.40 
r Resolved j~ Me [  Interfaces I] 
RÖt: fc^eiupj 
li^:"??7r- -?:~IP--:.-.'.-.-^-.-''-.-| fTineoutj; ,- - -'—...,—,Scan.ty|»^--—.^-H■' \^^~Scaiii^^^4 
rStartjl92.168.100.40   ~|-|. j '■' Prig.'   ■ ;!* flesoh^hbsteiamefc'r.' -.^-l ^ - ; BBjBSjMBIW^lJBil 
'--^    -'.   .      ., :-rT—.----. ;'|--p' Show host responses^' •" /ci'^-j-L-^BGfiHHI^ESil'"; 
^..r,..'...   :.,.',..     '."j KJ2000 
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*■ *     21  File Transfer Protocol [Control] 




Save    j 
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.EiparvlaE 
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"  1 
Prune    | 
Snapshot 18 - SuperScan vs. Win2K with only ports 21 & 80 open 
The TCP/IP filtering utility is a helpful tool for knowledgeable network 
administrator who has a clear understanding of the ports necessary for a server to perform 
its operations. However, restricted port access does not circumvent the need for a quality 
ID system. The ID system will still generate valuable alerts notifying the user and 
administrator of port scans and possible intrusion attempts in addition to providing the 
ability to trace the source of the attack. In the absence of a host-based ID system, port 
restrictions would be recommended. 
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E.        SUMMARY OF DATA COLLECTED 
Table 7 below depicts the overall performance of each ID system in its various 
configurations. Explanation of table contents: 
Column one: name of ID system installed 
Column two: configuration of ID system 
Column three: was host IP address identified 
Column four: was hostname identified 
Column five: number of open ports detected 
Column six: could FTP connection be established 
Column seven: was a ping response received 
IDS IDS MODE ID HOST RESOLVE HOSTNAME # OF OPEN PORTS FTP ACCESS PING RETURN 
NONE N/A YES YES 21 YES YES 
ZONEALARM LOW/LOW YES YES 21 YES YES 
ff« LOW/MED YES NO 18 YES YES 
n MED/MED YES NO 18 YES YES 
n LOW/HIGH NO NO 0 NO NO 
" MED/HIGH NO NO 0 NO NO 
ft HIGH/HIGH NO NO 0 NO NO 
BLACKICE TRUSTING YES N/A* 21 YES YES 
ti CAUTIOUS YES N/A* 2 NO YES 
n NERVOUS YES N/A* 0 NO YES 
tt PARANOID YES N/A* 0 NO YES 
* USER SPECIFIED, SEE BLACKICE WRITEUP. 
SYGATE ALLOW YES YES 21 YES YES 
M NORMAL NO YES 0 NO NO 
n BLOCK NO NO 0                            NO NO 
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F.        COMPARISON OF ID SYSTEMS 
The previous snapshots and tables help to illustrate that all three Host-based 
Intrusion Detection Systems perform well in preventing a port scan run against a 
Windows 2000 Server platform. Properly configured, they also successfully prevented a 
direct connection through FTP port 21. Further analysis of these three programs indicates 
that differences do exist. 
One significant difference, not highlighted in the test data since only inbound 
traffic was reported, involves the ID systems ability to control and restrict outbound 
traffic.   ZoneAlarm and Sygate use a "rules-based approach", meaning that the user is 
asked to allow or disallow all outbound program connections. BlacklCE does not employ 
this methodology and therefore lacks this feature.    This is a significant pitfall for 
BlacklCE because the potential exists to download utilities that may contain Trojan horse 
programs, such as the "Back Orifice" Trojan, with any client computer that has Internet 
access using an application proxy and a firewall. A Trojan of this nature can infest itself 
within the machine and initiated (outbound) traffic from the host to connect to Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) servers and such. If the harmful program is initiated from the host then 
BlacklCE will not provide protection and the system is vulnerable to widespread attacks. 
The danger of this makes it imperative that a good host-based ID system be complete 
with outgoing traffic monitoring as well as screening all incoming traffic. 
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BlacklCE also lacked the ability to block ping replies. Both ZoneAlarm and 
Sygate do not reply to ping attempts in their more secure modes. At first glance this may 
not seem significant because a ping flood cannot be stopped, and if a specific IP address 
is targeted, this feature has no benefit. However, if an IP address is not widely known 
and is not specifically targeted, this feature is key. By not replying to a ping, the 
computer is basically in stealth mode, and an attacker scanning a range of IP addresses 
will not detect the machine. This feature can prevent an attacker from ever launching an 
attack. 
All three ID systems offer the benefit of being able to back trace a suspicious 
packet. This feature provides system administrators the ability to identify and report the 
source of illegal activity to the proper authorities. Although most attackers will take 
measures to guarantee their anonymity, it is still a useful feature for reporting intrusion 
attempts. It is critical to protect networks from intrusions, but it is also important, to 
identify if possible, the source of the intrusion attempts. 
Analysis of the evaluation criteria key elements outlined in Chapter 3 follows: 
• Effectiveness of intrusion detection - All three programs performed 
adequately at detecting, reporting and preventing intrusions. 
• Effectiveness of security protection - All three programs provided good 
protection when configured in their most secure mode (Internet High for 
ZoneAlarm, Paranoid for BlacklCE and Block All for Sygate). Sygate blocks 
all inbound and outbound communications in this configuration isolating the 
system. ZoneAlarm and BlacklCE both allowed communications to continue 
while maintaining a tight security posture. In more promiscuous 
configurations the protection suffered.   BlacklCE revealed 2 open ports in 
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Nervous mode, 18 open ports in Cautious mode and 21 open ports in Trusting 
mode. Sygate blocked all ports but allowed the host name to be resolved in 
Normal mode. In Allow mode, Sygate correctly logged all the port scan 
activity but revealed all open ports. ZoneAlarm revealed open ports in both 
Internet Medium and Internet Low modes. 
• Effectiveness of reaction - All three programs performed sufficiently by 
quickly and effectively blocking port scans and denying access to connection 
attempts from FTP. However, BlacklCE and Sygate lack a pop-up window 
alerting the user to the attack. Users must keep their eye on the system tray to 
look for a "blinking" icon. 
• User interface - All three systems were easy to install and configure. 
BlacklCE, based on the fact that it doesn't employ rule-based monitoring, was 
extremely user friendly and hands off. ZoneAlarm and Sygate have numerous 
pop-up screens that require the user to allow or disallow communications. 
Based on the results of tests conducted and the interaction with each of the ID 
systems, Table 8 below shows a breakdown of how each system compares. Each feature 
is graded using a scale of 1 - 10, with 10 being most favorable. 
ID SYSTEM ZONEALARM BLACKICE SYGATE 
EASE OF INSTALLATION & USE 8 9 8 
CONFIGURABILITY 9 8 9 
OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS 9 8 9 
USER INTERFACE 9 7 8 
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Although, none of the ID systems evaluated satisfy all the expectations of what an 
ideal ID system should provide. Each system did provide obvious improvements over an 
unprotected system and they all had strengths that were unique to their program. Sygate 
offered password protection capability so that an administrator could install the program 
on a client computer and prevent the user from changing the security settings. BlacklCE 
was the least intrusive and offered the widest selection of security profiles. However, 
ZoneAlarm's ability to control outbound traffic, hide the IP address from scans and 
display pop-up window alerts made it the best of the three systems tested. 
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V.        SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A.       SUMMARY 
Secure systems are essential to ensure effective information operations and protect 
network security. A high percentage of crackers are opportunists who run scanners to 
check massive numbers of hosts for remote system vulnerabilities. A typical DoD 
organization may have 5 external web servers, 2 external mail servers, and a firewall 
protecting the network. Crackers wanting to gain access to the organization's network 
will commonly target these servers. Servers located outside the firewall must exchange 
information with servers within the network firewall. This provides attackers with an 
enticing target of opportunity to gain access to the internal network and jeopardize the 
security of the entire system. Utilizing a host-based ID system on all government 
network computers located outside the firewall would provide an additional level of 
security and a method of real-time monitoring. 
In addition, using a defense-in-depth approach, host-based ID systems would 
provide system administrators with a valuable utility if installed on all client computers 
throughout the network. Similar to the common practice of utilizing anti-virus software 
as a security precaution to protect networks, a properly designed and configured host- 
based ID system should be implemented to add additional safeguards to government 
networks. The effective deployment of host-based ID systems would consist of 
individual systems installed on each machine throughout a network with a centralized 
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reporting mechanism to one location.    This would enable network administrators to 
efficiently monitor the entire network for malicious activity. 
B.       CONCLUSION 
Although the ID systems tested offer significant benefits to network security, none 
of them can satisfy all the requirements of an ideal program for government use. 
However, with more than 150 commercial vendors currently in the industry, a system can 
be designed to meet the needs of protecting government networks. As a result of this 
research the following conclusions have been reached. First and foremost, the Host- 
based ID system designed for the government must come from a trusted vendor. The 
risks are too great to install software on every government system that could contain 
potentially hazardous code. The following is a list of recommendations to be considered 
in determining the design requirements for an ideal host-based ED system: 
Impose minimal overhead on the system 
Observe deviations from normal behavior, yet be able to adapt to changes 
in the system profile that occur over time 
Run on client computers but report to a central monitoring location 
Have password protection to prevent individuals from changing the 
configuration once it is set-up 
Block all unauthorized incoming and outgoing traffic 
Accurate signature database, with timely updates 
Be extremely difficult to fool 
Be able to monitor itself to recognize if it has been subverted 
Allow its internal working to be examined from the outside 
Be able to back trace any intrusion attempts to help identify intruders 
60 
As network security concerns continue to increase, the need for additional security 
measures is paramount. The tests conducted have adequately supported that host-based 
ID systems can help facilitate such security enhancements. Host-based ID systems can be 
utilized to increase network security in two manners: they can provide a shield of 
protection on the susceptible servers located outside the network firewall, and they can 
work in conjunction with the network ID system by providing an additional layer of 
protection on client workstations within the network firewall. Host-based ID systems are 
relatively inexpensive and easy to operate, similar to anti-virus programs, and can provide 
the overall defense-in-depth network security architecture needed to safeguard today's 
systems. 
A security vulnerability exists that affects every computer system in the 
world — regardless of hardware or software. This vulnerability extends 
worldwide; it's massive, severe, and just plain scary. Despite years of 
modifications and real-time testing, no patch is currently available. First 
discovered in a place known as "The Garden of Eden," a serpent 
convinced a woman called Eve that eating an apple would provide her 
knowledge of good and evil. While knowledge of good and evil was 
indeed imparted, differentiating between the two was apparently not part 
of the package. [Ref 9] 
Vulnerabilities may always exist, but they can be made difficult to find. 
Knowledge of an impending attack gives the defender the advantage. Host-based ID 
systems can accomplish both tasks. 
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